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"Money will force a Railway anywhere...": Construction 
of the Cairns-Kuranda railway line, 1886-1892 
Alan Smith 
The railway that connects the north Queensland coastal town of Caims 
with the Atherton Tablelands was first seriously considered in the early 
1880s to provide communication between the mining town of Herberton 
and the coast. It was the railway policy of the govemment of the day to 
connect both towns by what was known as a "developmental" line: one 
which would be built and operated at minimal cost, while serving to open 
up to development and settlement the region through which it passed. The 
principal difficulty of buildmg the line was that the coastal range, extending 
from well north of Port Douglas to south of Mourilyan Harbour, posed a 
significant obstacle. Proposed routes from Port Douglas, Caims and 
Mourilyan Harbour were considered in terms of their total distance, their 
maximum height above sea level,' and their economy in overcoming the 
obstacle of the coastal range. Following extensive surveys, the Cauns route 
was chosen because its shorter length would require less time for 
constmction. The superiority of Caims harbour^ and of the timber country 
that this line would open up, meant that this route best served the 
government's purpose. 
The railway was to be built from the coastal terminus inland in a number 
of stages, or sections. The first extended from Caims to the base of the 
coastal range, whilst the second climbed the escarpment of the coastal range 
via the gorge formed by the Barron River as it fell to the coastal plain.^  
The higher the altitude, the greater the cost of building and maintenance. 
Port Douglas's open roadstead would have necessitated the lighterage of cargoes; 
Mourilyan Harbour, although deep, could accommodate only a few vessels at a time. 
The railway was officially opened to Herberton on 20 October 1910. The total capital 
cost of the railway (including buildings) by the end of the 1911 financial year was: 
Section Cost Cost/Mile 
Caims-Mareeba £1,320,476 £27,747 
Mareeba-Atherton £63,149 £2,970 
Atherton-Herberton £127,750 £8,562 
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Selection of the Barron Gorge route in preference to those from other 
towns, and even alternative routes from Caims itself, was due to the fact 
that the lowest point in the coastal range was at the head of the Barron 
Gorge, at 1,050 feet* 
From the outset, the govemment surveyors on the second section were 
confronted with terrain so steep and unstable that they often had to be slung 
over the mountainside on ropes in order to put in their markers. At one 
point the difficulties were so great that they sunply marked the plan 
"inaccessible". Many of the spurs were enormous landslips with little 
stability or sfratification. The surveyors must have been aware of this, yet 
failed to follow standard Railway Departmental procedure and order the 
sinking of frial shafts to find proper foundation. 
This appears surprising in view of the numerous preliminary surveys that 
preceded selection of the route up the Barron Gorge. It may be attributed in 
part to the costs and delays imposed by those surveys, together with the 
obvious superiority of the chosen route over any altemative. 
The line between Caims and Kuranda effectively comprises two 
different railways: a coastal line to Redlynch, and a mountain railway to the 
top of the coastal range. It was from the government's failure to 
acknowledge this essential distinction that the confractor for the second 
section was to suffer so much hardship.^ Indeed, while this paper is 
principally concerned with the constmction of the second section, the 
failure of two separate confractors to complete the comparatively easy first 
section will be examined in order to highlight the accomplishment in 
These figures illustrate the significant costs associated with the difficult Caims Range 
section. Letter, Deputy Commissioner Queensland Railways, to Mr P.C. Savage, 20 
December 1985. 
Compared with, for instance, 1,450 feet on the route from Port Douglas, which also 
traversed more difficult slopes. "Railway Surveys from Herberton to the coast and fi'om 
the coast to Herberton", Minutes of the Executive Council, 1884, p.583. 
Indeed, the very "form" nature of the contract for the second section was "prepared 
almost altogether irrespective of the peculiar character of the country through which the 
line had to be made". Robb v. The Railway Commissioners, p.3. (Records of the 
proceedings in the arbitration case between the Commissioner for Railways and John 
Robb, vols 1 and 3, 1892-3, QSA, no.CRS/T577-78). 
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forcing a line up the Barron Gorge. The confractors who undertook to build 
the first section of the line to the base of the coastal range can be held 
largely responsible for the problems they encountered. The confractor for 
the second section, however, had to overcome difficulties with the terrain, 
the weather, and even his labour force, in addition to challenges associated 
with continual alteration of the works he was ordered to perform by the 
Railway Department. 
Considering the terrain over which the second section was built, it is not 
surprising that human lives were lost. It is surprising to leam, however, of 
the deaths of workers on the first section. While the first section was bulk 
over easy, level terrain, it passed through swamps which, together with 
mismanagement on the part of the confractors, confributed to much of the 
widespread sickness in camps established at various points along the line. 
Deaths on the railway became a matter of concem in the town when it 
became apparent that sheer neglect had compounded the effects of sickness 
in leading to the deaths of two men on the line. Beimett died at the Five-
Mile Camp after suffering for several days from a fever so severe that his 
workmates had allegedly called for the railway timekeeper to dispatch him 
to the hospital, "as there was no means of attending to him there on the 
spot".^  Despite a visit from Dr Hammond, the confractor's medical officer, 
the man died after a week's illness. A similar fate befell Thomas Holland, 
who after requesting to be fransferred to the hospital following a severe 
attack of fever, was not furnished with the necessary medical certificate.' 
Refused admission, he died through lack of the necessary attention. 
Despite the belief at the time that white men could not endure hard 
physical work in the fropics,* the editor of the Caims Post blamed the 
confractor's negligence for the poor health of railway workers. The lack of 
a field hospital was evidence that there was "no consideration whatever 
given to the navvies by the confractor in the event of sickness occurring 
Cairns Post, 5 August 1886. 
The hospital had agreed to admit employees bearing certificates from the contractor's 
medical officer, and to treat them at a flat rate of 21/- per patient per week. 
See P. Courtenay, "The White Man and the Australian Tropics", Lectures on North 
Queensland History, Second Series, Townsville 1975, pp.57-66. 
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among them".' The absence of proper nourishment and attendance was 
therefore seen as instmmental in contributmg to Bennett's death. The fragic 
death of Hobson, a railway employee brought to the hospital on the night 
of 29 October 1886, revealed the extent of the insanitary working and living 
conditions in the camps on the line. Hobson had been suffering from 
malarial fever for a fortnight, and had refiised to move from where he was 
lying on the ground in a tent in one of the camps along the line, despite 
enfreaties from workmates and Dr Hammond. The hospital wardsman, 
testifying to a Magisterial inquiry, reported that upon admitting the victim 
he had 
found a large bmise or bed sore at the bottom of his back, and at the bottom 
of the bmise there was a hole large enough to admit a man's little finger; the 
hole had been fly-blown, and was swarming with maggots; the deceased was 
covered from the knees to the shoulders with human excrement, and was in 
a fearfiilly dirty state.'" 
While living conditions in the camps improved following the inquiry, 
serious doubts about the manner in which the constmction of the first 
section was being undertaken were widely expressed. Interestingly enough, 
criticism was directed towards the govemment rather than P.C. Smith, the 
confractor of the first section. The Caims Chamber of Commerce, from a 
position of refrospective wisdom, suddenly recalled that: 
From the moment the name of the successful tenderer for the fu-st section 
was made known a feeling of distmst was manifested, and unpleasant 
forebodings were heard that an unsatisfactory result from such a confract 
was quite within the range of probability." 
Similarly, the inefficiency of the works currently being undertaken 
fascinated Caims residents. Smith's progress in undertaking the clearing 
9 
10 
II 
Caims Post, 12 August 1886. 
/itV/., 4 November 1886. 
/Z>/rf., 9 September 1886. 
7. Reception for the Governor, April 1888 
(National Library of Ausfralia) 
The Stoney Creek bridge was the venue chosen for the reception for Govemor 
Sir Henry Wylie Norman. FoUowmg an impressive reception on the wharf to mark 
his first official visit to Caims, a tour of inspection of the railway line was organised 
by the contractor's representatives: chief engineer Buchanan, general manager 
Stranger and Gordon, Robb's chief accountant (Robb was not in Caims at the time). 
Over 150 guests escorting the vice-regal party were conveyed along the line in a 
special train consistmg of two open tmcks fitted with seats that provided the 
occupants with an unintermpted view of the scenery along the line: 
...long before the end of the journey had been reached, [the visitors'] 
vocabularies of admiring adjectives were exhausted, and words had to be 
coined for the occasion. The word gorgeous led to considerable play. 
Gorgeous said all at the scenery, gorgeous said many at the different 
gorges, and gorge-US said a few when the luncheon came on for discussion 
Cairns Post, 30 April 1888 
Some chose to welcome the Govemor in a rather novel manner, for the Cairns Post 
observed that "after a long period of inactivity the sanitary van was shifted on 
Sunday night, pamted all over with appropriate but scarcely complimentary 
remarks, and left in the middle of Lake-sfreet. The larrikan [sic] work was 
discovered in time to remedy it before the Govemor arrived." Ibid. 
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work on the second section attracted much criticism.'^  The intention of the 
govemment to build the line as cheaply as possible was apparent to all, even 
at this early stage; the Caims Post failed to see "why the Govemment 
should have let the contract for clearing the scmb on this second section at 
a price which they must have known could not be profitably carried 
through".'^ By early November, it would appear that both Smith and the 
govemment had had enough of the first section. Following a short delay 
caused by the drawing up of new agreements and bond arrangements, 
McBride and Co. officially took over the works on 19 November 1886." 
Little improvement resulted from the change.'^  By late January no 
sleepers had been laid from the railway station to the end of the section, 
leading the Caims Post to describe the progress as "a repetition of the 
manner in which P.C. Smith conducted the work, with the exception only 
that the men are regularly paid their wages''.'^ It should not have been 
surprising; the price for completion was calculated on the basis of Smith's 
original tender and, like Smith, McBride had seriously underestimated the 
men, material and time that would be required. The Railway Department 
was obliged to complete the work on the first section, which was opened to 
ordinary fraffic on 8 October 1887. Little of consequence marked the 
opening of the first section, save the expected recriminations against 
contractors, and expressions of hope for the rapid completion of the second 
section. 
Toohey, contracted to clear five miles of the second section at £110 per mile, had done 
so "within the specified contract time in a satisfactory maimer" by late October 1886. 
The remaining section of about seven miles was to be cleared by P.C. Smith at £80 per 
mile, "at which price it was well known the work could not be done and leave a margin 
of profit to the contractor". Ibid., 28 October 1886. 
/AiV/., 14 October 1886. 
The only complaints voiced in parliament concerned the fact that men employed by 
Smith had not been paid. Following resolution of this problem, the Minister for Works 
advised that no further action appeared necessary. Queensland Legislative Assembly, 7 
September 1886. McBride wasted little time, calling for bullock teams to contract for 
timber hauling, as well as ordering a shipment of 3,000 railway sleepers from Mackay. 
Up to March 1887. 
Cairns Post, 27 January 1887. 
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The failure of McBride and Co. to complete the section that P.C. Smith 
had commenced, together with the need for the Railway Department to 
finish the work,'' held a lesson for the govemment. By employing two 
relatively inexperienced confractors in an attempt to build the line cheaply, 
the Railway Department succeeded only in adding to the delays and costs 
associated with what would prove to be one of the costliest lines in the 
colony of Queensland. Furthermore, difficulties encountered on this section 
would have implications for the attempt to extend the line over the range. 
The selection of a very experienced confractor for the second section, 
together with the provision of adequate health facilities and other 
arrangements for his workers, prevented a repeat of the circumstances for 
which the constmction of the comparatively "easy" coastal section is best 
known. 
The opening of tenders for the second section led to calls for wisdom on 
the part of the govemment to ensure that work of a suitable and efficient 
quality would resuh.'* On 20 January 1887 that of John Robb for 
£290,984/3/- was accepted.'' Residents of Cafrns and district were reassured 
"Taken over by department" was the terse comment in the "Report upon the General 
Working of the Railway Department for the Year ending 31 December 1886", 
Queensland Votes and Proceedings, 1887, p.998. 
Queensland Government Gazette, 8 October 1886, p. 1405. 
John Robb (1834-1896) was bom in Londonderry, Northem Ireland. The son of a 
gentleman, he emigrated to Victoria around 1854 and established himself as a contractor, 
first in partnership with Best Overend as Overend and Robb (but later on his own 
following the death of Overend in 1877), initially undertaking water supply and drainage 
works in Victoria, but later railway works, building the Wangaratta-Beechworth line and 
sections of other lines, including the Ararat-Hamilton line. A quiet yet effective 
negotiator and administrator, Robb had undertaken numerous public works contracts 
prior to his involvement with the Caims Railway. Significant among these was part of 
the Adelaide sewers, and the first section of the Fremantle to Guildford railway in 
Westem Australia. Robb's Building in King Street was, upon its completion in 1885, the 
tallest structure in Melboume. The Australian Dictionary of Biography notes that he was 
"constantly on the move" attending to his varied undertakings and holdings, which at the 
time of the construction of the second section of the Caims Railway included 
partnerships in a sugar plantation on the Tweed River in New South Wales and joint 
ownership of two stations in the Warrego district of Queensland. Australian Dictionary 
of Biography, vol.6, Carlton 1966, pp.33-34. 
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to leam that it was Robb's intention to constmct a hospital and surgeon's 
residence as part of his headquarters at Stoney Creek. 
Work on the section did not proceed in a linear fashion, but was 
undertaken simultaneously all along the line, the railhead being extended 
upon the completion of a tunnel or an embankment. This encouraged the 
establishment of camps at various points along the line, which the Caims 
Post observed were "springing up with mushroom-like rapidity".^ ° These 
settlements functioned as small townships, often housing several hundred 
employees m addition to storekeepers, hoteliers and govemment officials.^ ' 
Located in the vicinity of major constmction sites such as tunnels, these 
camps were essentially fransitory stmctures which were dismantled and 
relocated at the next major work, be it a bridge, tunnel or cutting. An 
excellent example was "New Caims", which boasted a hotel, several 
boarding houses and stores. Located on the lower side of the Horseshoe 
Bend, it served as a cenfre for workers at and in the vicinity of that site. 
W^en the cutting was completed in July 1888, the camp rapidly assumed 
a "dismantled and dreary appearance owing to the general exodus of its 
inhabitants".^ Other camps worthy of note were built at The Springs and at 
Stoney Creek. Life for the inhabitants of these camps could often be as 
hazardous as for navvies at the worksites. Mrs T. Dillon, whose father was 
employed in a variety of tasks on the line, recalled that while her family 
were living at No. 10 tunnel, we had a nasty accident to one of my sisters. 
They were blasting in the tunnel and a stone flew out and came through the 
roof of the tent. It hit her on the knee and shattered it. She was taken on a 
sfretcher down to Kamerunga where there was a first aid station. Kamerunga 
was quite a big place then. I believe there were 13 hotels there.^  
^^  Cairns Post, 6 June 1888. 
'^ One difficulty faced by Robb concerned absenteeism among his workers as a result of 
over-indulgence in alcohol, linked to the proliferation of "sly-grog" shanties. 
^ Cajrnsi'05^ 12 December 1888. 
T. Dillon, "Early Experiences of the Caims-Kuranda Railway", Caims Historical Society 
Bulletin, no.34, November 1961. 
23 
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The difficulties that Robb had to overcome during the constmction of 
the second section can be largely attributed to the inability of the 
govemment surveyors to determine accurately where the line should go; 
where adequate foundation for the line existed. The deaths for which this 
section is infamous, together with the lesser-known financial cost to the 
confractor, were a direct consequence of the lack of a thorough survey in 
the first instance. A chronological analysis of the constmction would not 
illusfrate the manner in which the various works were undertaken, nor 
would it convey how difficulties or alterations at one point on the line could 
seriously delay progress on other works, and hence confribute significantly 
to delays and the cost to the confractor. However an exammation of selected 
aspects of the constmction (the provision of earthworks, tunnels and 
bridges)^ '* provides an insight into constmction techniques employed to 
overcome challenges imposed by both the terrain and the govemment. 
The greatest difficulties experienced on the section concemed 
earthworks undertaken to fraverse spurs and valleys. The fransport of 
material to the first cuttings on the section was greatly facilitated by 
completion of the Horseshoe Bend at 8 miles, 78 chains. Some 60,000 cubic 
yards of earth were required to complete the first engineering challenge on 
the section.^ Upon its completion in July 1888, work on tunnels and bridges 
fiirther up the line progressed steadily. Work on cuttings also proceeded 
rapidly, but was severely affected by the onset of the wet season of 1888.^ * 
The confractor's difficulties with works undertaken in the cuttings 
between cutting No. II and Surprise Creek '^ were prompted by the 
govemment officers' indecision as to the final slope of the sides of cuttings. 
24 
25 
In an ^pendbc to the "Report upon the General Working of the Railway Department for 
the Year ending 30 June 1890", the Railway Commissioner summarised progress on the 
line by the use of these same categories of works. 
Cairns Post, 1 October 1887. 
Caims receives an average annual rainfall of 218cm, most falling between January and 
April. Over 300cm of rain fell in the wet season of 1888. A.D. Broughton, "The Rain, 
the Range and the Railway", in A. Broughton & S. Stephens (eds). Establishment of 
Trinity Bay, Caims 1984", p.37. 
These were the deepest of the 153 cuttings on the second section, and the most difficult 
Robb V. the Railway Commissioners, p. 19. 
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It seemed to Robb that a "frial and error" system was adopted by the 
officers of the Department, whereby "it was a case of go on till you find out; 
try, try, and try again till you find what you want. That was the system 
which was adopted in these stupendous cuttings".^^ The reasoning behind 
the government's use of the "trial and ertor" method of constmcting the line 
was not lost on the confractor. 
Of course the system was to avoid expense - a very laudable object when the 
magnimde of the work is taken into consideration. The Chief Engineer 
deserves credit for being actaated by such a motive; but it is another thing 
when this excellent result is to be done at the cost of another man. '^ 
The confractor, however, was bound to abide by the directions of the 
govemment officers on the line.^ ° Thus the engineer's decision at the end of 
the day as to what constituted a safe slope of foundation could be, and often 
was, modified following a day of heavy rain, the result being new orders for 
the confractor to follow: "Slice off that from this cutting, and slice off this 
from that; blast that rock, and leave this one alone",^' and so on from day 
to day. 
As early as 6 April 1887 Robb wrote to Henry Warren, Assistant Disfrict 
Engineer for the Second Section: "please supply me as early as possible 
with a complete set of plans...for the second section of the Caims and 
Herberton line".^ ^ Robb's concem that he was pushing blindly up the Barron 
Gorge is unmistakably expressed in this same communication. 
With respect to the five deviations which you have aheady set out in the 
Ime, and as I understand that this is only the first batch of deviations which 
you intend making, I would respectfiiUy call your attention to the fact that 
these deviations are altering the whole nature of my contract, as originally 
signed for by me at Brisbane, and, in point of fact, it appears that you are 
30 
Ibid. 
A. Rutledge to the hearing. Ibid. 
Section 10 of the contract required the contractor to obey all instructions, either oral or 
written, issued by the Chief Engineer. 
Robb V. the Railway Commissioners, p. 19. 
Ibid, ^.\522. 
f.'*. 
l^ 
-Al*-* i J ^ ^ 
v<: 
" 1 * ^ ^ ^ 
^ * 
8. "Material to spoil" 
Material removed during the constmction of tunnels and cuttings was either 
assigned to the construction of embankments, or if not required, simply dumped 
over the edge of the formation into the gorge below. Material brought down from 
the second section was also used for landfills in Caims, permitting the extension of 
habitable land back from the seafront. 
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going to ask me to constmct a totally different line to the line I tendered 
for.^ ^ 
The mstability of the foundation that resulted in the effective re-routing of 
the line, along with the dismption to the calculated proportions of material 
to bank and spoil, was instmmental in altering the nature of works required. 
For example, a number of timber bridges originally specified were 
dispensed with when it became obvious to both the confractor and the Chief 
Engineer that: 
[e]ven if you took your piers down as low as 200 feet you could not have 
made sure of fmdmg anything like a foundation, and it was therefore plain 
that bridges should never have been put there and so it was shown that it 
would be better to put an embankment in the upper part of the ravine rather 
than span it with a bridge.^ '' 
The difficulties associated with tunnel constmction may be better 
appreciated when one considers that the "sides" of the Barron Gorge are a 
series of spurs, little more than landslips." During the four years and five 
months of constmction work, no less than 1371cm of rain fell on these soft 
outer frontages, through and around which the line was to be built. It seems 
Ibid. 
Ibid., p.24. In those cases where the ground was too hard for piles to be driven, an 
excavation of not less than three feet was made, and finished with a layer of concrete in 
order to provide even footing for the pile, which was cut square. Prior to being lowered 
into the excavation, the lower part of the pile from its base to one foot above the level 
of the excavation was thoroughly and carefully charred. The charcoal was then removed 
from the portion of the pile to be surrounded by concrete; the effect was to prevent 
loosening of the pile through decay of sap wood. Wooden wedges were then placed 
between the pile and the walls of the excavation, until the pile had been positioned at the 
correct angle. At each stage, the concrete was rammed by two men, one on either side 
of the pile, using iron bars. 
Ibid., p.2. 
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surprising, therefore, that there were not more than fifteen tunnels^^ buih 
through the spurs of the Barron Gorge. 
Climatic considerations aside, the varying proportions of soft and hard 
material that were encountered from one spur to the next," or even within 
a spur, required the implementation of special constmction techniques, and 
hence tunnel constmction on the second section serves as an excellent 
example of how decisions on the part of the Railway Department interfered 
with the efficient execution of the confract. A tunnel was built through a 
spur in three stages. First a 'heading' was cut: a narrow excavation right 
through the spur along the intended line. The heading was then expanded 
into a tunnel, mainly by blasting. Finally the tunnel was enlarged to size and 
the walls trimmed to approximate the desired shape. Usual practice was to 
position the heading near the apex of the future tunnel, which was then bulk 
m effect from the top down. This was simpler and much more economical 
than excavating upwards from a 'bottom heading': one cut at, or near, the 
intended level of the railway line. 
No written order was ever issued to the confractor for a tunnel to be buih 
from a bottom heading, but that was the inevitable consequence of the 
altered disposal of earthworks already discussed. Embankments on the 
Caims side of Tunnels 8,10,11 and 13 had to be constmcted with material 
from the far side of the spur in each instance. Bottom headings had to be 
built so that material could be conveyed by wagon through the spur at the 
level of the finished railway line. The unstable ground made it necessary to 
cut a top heading as well so that the excavation could be timbered during 
constmction. 
The serrated nature of the Barron Gorge not only dictated the need for 
tunnels, but also for numerous bridges which, perched precariously on the 
gorge wall, would span the watercourses plummeting into the Barron River. 
While the majority of the bridges on the range section were made from 
36 
37 
The fifteenth and fmal tuimel on the line was located at the Caims end of Surprise Creek. 
Completed in March 1891, its length of 21 chains led to it being dubbed the "big" or 
"long" tunnel. 
For instance, little difficulty was encountered in the excavation of Timnels 1, 2, 3 and 
4, "the complaints, if any, during the work were rather in the direction of the ground 
being found to be too soft in parts to be readily dealt with". Cairns Post, 1 October 1887. 
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timber, the need for the line to hug the escarpment as it threaded its way in 
and around steep spurs resulted in the larger watercourses being spanned by 
iron stmctures. 
From late 1888 onwards, the bulk of Robb's attention was directed at 
that portion of the line from the Red Bluff to the end of the section. All 
earthworks on the earlier part of the section had been completed; work on 
tunnels (including cementing) was well advanced; and the line was ready 
for rails up to No. 11 bridge. Gfrders for bridge No. 15, the second iron 
stmcture, were awaiting shipment to the site. Their weight dictated fransport 
by rail, and so constmction of this bridge, along with bridge No.25, was 
dependent on the advancing railhead. Foundation work for bridges above 
No. 19 was proceeding satisfactorily. Bridge No.29 at The Springs was 
completed by early December 1888, whereas foundation work for bridge 
No. 16 was delayed, owing to it bemg found necessary to excavate as deeply 
as 31 feet to obtain solid footing for this 120-foot stmcture. 
No elaborate foundation work was required on the Stoney Creek bridge, 
however, as it was built on a ledge of solid rock.^ * The presence of Stoney 
Creek Falls and the existence of a natural ledge of rock in their immediate 
vicinity required the bridge to be built of steel and to be constmcted on a 
sharp bend. 
While the iron bridges on the Caims railway, such as No. 11 and that 
spanning Stoney Creek were impressive feats of engineering skill, it was in 
connection with timber bridges, in particular their altitude and precarious 
location, that Robb was to encounter most hardship and delay. In the 
Legislative Assembly of 5 October 1887, Macrossan wamed that the use of 
scmb timbers for constmction: 
may be the means of some great calamity on the railway, because great 
strength is required in the superstracture of a bridge as well as in the piers 
or piles of the bridge, and none of that timber will bear any strain after a few 
months. I have seen it after having been erected only a few months, breaking 
in two quite easily, like a carrot.^ ' 
'^ Report, District Engineer to Chief Engineer, 26 August 1909. QSA, nos 6/498, 1909, 
A/12389. 
Queensland Legislative Assembly, 5 October 1887, p.886. 39 
11. Interior of a tunnel 
(John Oxley Library) 
Scmb timbers were used extensively during the constmction of tunnels. As well 
as supporting the roof and walls of the drive, and providmg protection to workmen 
therein, timber was also employed in the positioning and setting of the concrete that 
would provide the stmcture with both form and strength. 
A temporary timber wall would be constmcted throughout the interior of the 
tunnel, from which a retaining wall of concrete would be produced in such a way 
that a gap with the jagged edge of the original excavation would resuh. This gap 
was usually filled with carefully packed dry mbble. Earthenware piping served to 
direct intrading water to weeping holes m the concrete lining, from where it could 
escape to the drams at formation level. 
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While Caims residents were suspicious of Macrossan's disfress at the 
prospect of the use of northem hickory or satinwood upsetting a frain-load 
of people, concem over the durability of scmb timbers, in particular hickory 
and bloodwood, led the Commissioner for Railways on 18 October 1887 to 
appoint a commission to review the suitability of the different timbers in 
use at the tune and proposed for use on the second section of the railway."" 
The report of the Commission was submitted to the Commissioner for 
Railways on 19 November 1887. The recommendations, not easily squared 
with the experimental results or with the testimony obtained from 
witnesses, approved bloodwood for use in bridges and sleepers, and more 
cautiously approved the use of three other timber types for bridgework on 
a frial basis.*' The Commission optimistically advised that: 
no doubts be entertained of the safety of any of the bridges in the 
constmction of which scmb timbers have been used inasmuch as the spans 
are generally short, and where longer spans are used ample additional 
strength has been provided."^  
The recommendations of the Caims Railway Timber Commission had 
dire consequences for work on the line, where sufficient hickory for sills for 
bridges within the last two miles of the section had been cut and allowed to 
season in preparation for use. When Buchanan was informed that hickory 
was not acceptable for bridge constmction, the two sawmills established to 
produce sawn hickory sleepers had to close down, as there was not enough 
bloodwood m the vicinity to justify their continued operation. Bloodwood 
had to be brought dovm from sites close to the top of the range, often four 
The Commission was much influenced by adverse reports on local timbers used in the 
Mourilyan Sugar Co. Railway, even though they were not the same type as those used 
on the Caims line. Ibid, 20 October 1887. 
While recommending the use of Hickory, Resinwood and Bean-tree, however, the 
Commission was at pains to stress that "we regard their use in the light of an 
experiment...but with reasonable expectation that the three timbers named will be found 
to be sufficiently durable when used in the manner and places recommended by us." 
"Report of the Commission appointed to inquire and report on the timbers now being 
used, in the constmction of bridges, culverts, &c., on the second section, Caims 
Railway", p.4. QSA, Hard Batch no.58, 1887, A/9193. 
Ibid. 
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miles from the line, m place of the hickory which was to be found near the 
sites of these particular bridges. Furthermore, the resfricted use of hickory 
brought bridge constmction on the section to an abmpt halt until sufficient 
approved timber had been procured and freated, involving much delay and 
cost. 
The confractor's problems were not limited to the nature of the terrain or 
govemment interference. Despite Robb's attempts to push the line up the 
Barron Gorge with a minimum of expense and loss of life, the frequency 
and severity of accidents on the second section were cause for great 
dissatisfaction among workers and Caims residents. Of the 23 confirmed 
deaths among the workers on the second section,"^ many may be atfributed 
to misadventure or carelessness.''" However the conditions that workers had 
to endure were instmmental in the formation of a labour union among 
workers on the section. 
The first fatality on the second section, like many that were to follow, 
can be attributed to simple carelessness. A worker was rolling a log into a 
huge fire during clearing operations m a gully when he lost his balance and 
was propelled into the midst of the fire, where he was "charred to a 
cinder"."^ The first serious mjury on the line befell a man smoking near a 
box of blasting powder who carelessly threw a lighted match on to this very 
box. The Caims Post rep>orted that he "is now in the Hospital, domg as well 
as can be expected"."* Inexperience or lack of caution led to a young man 
named Riley suffering a fractured skull while blasting near Stoney Creek. 
After firing some blasts in a cutting, Riley had stepped forward to inspect 
J. Kerr, Triumph of Narrow Gauge: A History of the Queensland Railways, Brisbane 
1990, p.53. In the proceedings of Robb v. The Railway Commissioners, p. 1559, an 
estimate was provided of the number who perished: "there were nearly thirty men killed 
on the line. Thirty-two, I think, is the correct number". 
Men were reported as having died fi-om causes as diverse as snakebite and heart disease. 
Cairns Post, 28 May 1887. 
76/^., 18 May 1887. 
12. Relocation of the Stoney Creek bridge 
The threat of damage to the Stoney Creek bridge was serious enough to warrant 
the suggestion by the District Engineer at Caims in 1909 that the entire stmcture be 
relocated, or replaced by a tunnel: 
/ have made a survey of the creek below the bridge in order to ascertain 
length and height of bridging required, if the present bridge were to be 
abandoned. 
There are two sites which may be considered, one on a five chain curve 
about three chains below the present bridge. The length of bridge required 
would be, approximately, 590-fi. and the height of rails above the bed of 
the creek about 160-fi. The grade would be I in 60. The other site is on a 
7.15 chain radius curve about 6'/2 chns. below the existing bridge. The 
grade would be 1 in 58, the height of the rails above the creek bed about 
195-ft., and the length of bridging about 800-ft. Both these sites would be 
free of any danger from falling rocks. 
Another way of avoiding the dangerous rocks would be by tunneling 
behind the Falls. The total length of tunnel would be about 26 chns., about 
3/5 of which would be on a 5 chain curve. The cost of this would be at least 
£30,000. 
It is clear from the report that alternatives to the existmg crossing of Stoney Creek 
would be expensive and difficult to constmct. The present bridge rested on a natural 
ledge of rock, and being at the upper end of the gorge, was the minimum length for 
a crossing. As all the dangerous rock above the bridge would be removed by the 
end of the year, the District Engineer recommended that the best course of action 
would involve the retention of the existing bridge, and the removal of unsafe rock. 
Memorandum: District Engmeer, Cauns to Chief Engmeer, 
26 August 1909 
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the site. Unfortunately, he miscalculated the number of shots, with the result 
that as the last one fired he was showered with fragments of stone."' 
Patrick Tarvey died alone as he was working unaided in removmg loose 
rock from the Red Bluff with a crowbar. A large portion of the face on 
which he was perched gave way, and he was precipitated some four 
hundred feet uito the gorge."* During the constmction of the Stoney Creek 
bridge a workman fell from the stmcture. Richard Newbury plummeted 
fifty feet to the creek below the bridge while it was under constmction in 
June 1890: 
His mates, seeing the fall, expected to gather up the fragments that remained, 
but to their utter astonishment found hun very little the worse for his 
disaster. It appears that after dropping 25ft his fall was broken by a 
protmding ledge, so that the next drop of 25ft was not of material 
importance. Dr. Dobie reports no bones broken and no intemal injuries, 
although (says the doctor) by rights he should have dislocated his hip, 
broken his leg in three places, smashed his sternum, stove in his head, 
fracmred his ribs, and broken his neck."' 
Dissatisfaction with unsafe working conditions on the line, together with 
the freatment accorded sick and injured workers in the Caims hospital, led 
to the emergence of frade unionism on the second section. A letter from an 
injured navvy published in the Caims Post of 4 April 1888 highlighted 
several grievances. Navvies admitted to the Caims hospital were treated as 
Ibid., 26 October 1887. Death from a similar cause befell Walter Cornell, a 30-year-old 
Englishman, who having lit four charges in the face of a cutting, fell fifty feet to the 
foundation level in his haste to get clear. An inquiry held at Kamemnga determined that 
the fall, and not the explosion, resulted in this death. His death went unnoticed for more 
than an hour, his workmates having quit the area for lunch, not noticing his absence until 
their retum. Ibid., 7 November 1887. 
It was not usual practice for such work to be undertaken alone, but it was a payday, and 
Tarvey, having just started as a worker, had no money to draw, and remained at work 
while the others were being paid. The doctor was quickly on the scene, but Tarvey died 
within the hour. Ibid, 8 August 1888. 
Ibid., 14 June 1890. By 1909, danger fi-om overhanging rock at Stoney Creek prompted 
the suggestion that the entire stmcture be relocated. 
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"pauper patients"^ by virtue of an agreement reached between Robb and the 
hospital, whereby the former paid only one guinea per patient, irrespective 
of the length of stay.^ ' Navvies contributed one shilling per month to a sick 
fund established by the contractor, who was responsible for the care of sick 
or injured workers. Over £120 per month was collected in this way.^ ^ 
Despite glowing reports of the state of health of the men,^ ^ criticism of 
arrangements for injured workers reached a head in April, when it was 
proposed that the navvies form a frade union organised along the lines of 
the Victorian Railways and Public Works Laborers' Union. Such an 
organisation would enable the navvies to abolish compulsory deductions 
from wages, establish a regular wage-fixing system, and create a fiind to 
assist injured members. Despite some members chafing at the bit in calling 
for the formation of an autonomous Queensland union, it was agreed that 
the Victorian union could give a northem chapter greater sfrength. The 
union, which rejoiced in the title of the United Sons of Toil, was officially 
formed at a public meeting on 19 April as a branch of the Victorian body.^ " 
The formation of the union came amidst sfrong criticism of the hospital, 
which, unable to obtain more than the minimum confribution from Robb, 
enforced a regulation requiring pauper patients upon discharge to perform 
duties in the hospital or its grounds. The standard of medical care provided 
to workers was the first in a series of grievances presented by a deputation 
from the newly-formed labour union to Robb at his office at Stoney Creek 
/6W., 4 April 1888. 
Ibid 
Clauses 29 and 30 of the contract provided for the care of the workers, and the 
establishment of a fiind to provide for medicines and medical attention. An ambulance 
stretcher was fitted to the brake van of trains running along the line. This stretcher, 
originally employed in the ambulance carts of the British Army, was designed to isolate 
the patient by functioning like a hammock suspended fi'om the walls of the van, with 
oscillations reduced to a minimum. Ibid., 30 November 1887. 
It was reported that accidents had been "few and far between, and mostly of a trifling 
character" while there were no reported cases of fever. Ibid., 18 February 1888. 
An entrance fee of 5/- applied. 
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on Friday 29 June 1888.^ ^ Robb promised to arrange for the £160 then in the 
sick fund to be paid to the hospital. The navvies expressed their preference 
for sick and injured to be freated at Kamerunga in future. The navvies' fiind 
not only had to support the doctor's salary, his medicines and the 
maintenance of the injured at Kamemnga, but also the continued fransfer 
of injured workers to the Caims hospital.^ ^ While the Caims Post was 
firmly behind Robb, the relationship between the confractor and his 
employees was not quite as amicable as everyone liked to think. Treatment 
of sick and injured was a continual irritation to the navvies, resurfacing on 
numerous occasions in the latter half of 1890. 
On the moming of Wednesday 29 August 1890 Sfranger, Robb's general 
manager, announced a general reduction in wages of six pence,^' to apply 
from the end of the month. Following a preliminary meeting at The Springs, 
over 400 men marched down the line to Kamemnga to confront Robb. 
Speaking from the verandah of Dillon's Hotel later that aftemoon, Robb 
assured the assembly that the reduction had been made without his 
knowledge or authority, and that usual rates of pay would be maintained. 
This spurious claim was met with a demand for an increase in pay for all 
workers, with tunnel men to receive 91- per day. Robb abmptly ordered the 
men back to work, whereupon all the men in his employ stmck. Immediate 
arrangements were made to pay the men off, while to the strikers' credit, the 
Cairns Post observed that "[n]othing to injure the confractor has been 
done".^ * A public meeting and ballot held on 8 September voted 324 to 13 
for holding out. Some sub-confractors attempted to resume work, only to 
find no men available, or upon commencing work, found themselves forced 
to abandon it "on the representation of the sfrikers".^' 
The navvies had awaited Robb's retum before presenting their claims, as Buchanan was 
less sympathetic to their plight. 
Caims Post, 16 June 1888. 
From 8/6 to 8/-. 
Cairns Post, 30 August 1890. 
Ibid., 13 September 1890. The Cairns Post stressed that on these occasions there was "no 
intimidation used; the point was peacefiilly argued and the men left, that is all". Ibid. 
iU\W^ *i 
'tsm >^^'^^^g|g| ^ ^ ^ _ i g i ^ t-f^^-^yp^. 
13. Workers at a tunnel opening 
Note the manner in which timber has been used to support this partially completed 
tunnel. Also evident at the apex of the tunnel is loose rock used to fill the gap 
between the original excavation and the desired tunnel shape. (Oxley Library) 
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The sfrike was remarkably orderly, with the men swom off drink, and 
ensuring that the confractor's equipment was not endangered.^ However, 
as the sfrike wore on, increasing numbers of navvies left for the south as 
boarding-house proprietors and storekeepers found themselves unable to 
extend credit. '^ Numerous meetings and representations to the confractor 
achieved little,*^ and the people of Caims were rapidly losing patience with 
a sfrike which "drags its weary length along to the defriment of the 
disfrict".*^ In addition to the usual demands for completing a railway 
already long delayed, merchants were conscious of lost revenue from 
cessation of all work on the line. The United Sons of Toil also atfracted 
criticism: 
It is a matter of common report that at least ten of the men leaving to-night 
after three years work under Mr. John Robb have on an average £300 each 
to their credit. If these are solid facts what a parody of a strike it is after 
all...The men now leaving the line where they have been able to save 
handsomely practically condenm the present attimde of the Union...." 
Furthermore, the conduct of the navvies during the dispute, which had 
earlier received high praise, was now reported in a different light, where 
"the news that the men engaged to clear away the debris caused by the 
recent heavy rains, have been intimidated and have ceased work is not 
altogether reassuring".*^ These criticisms were keenly felt by the members 
of the Cafrns Railway League, who, in a meeting on 25 September executed 
an about-face in their relationship with the United Sons of Toil. A motion 
that "the Sons of Toil be written to, saying the League always advocates the 
rapid completion of the railway, but cannot ask the Govemment to bring 
The contractor's horses and draught animals were cared for during the dispute. 
While support was received from southem imions and even the miners of Croydon, the 
response of the local business community to subscription lists was reportedly "very 
moderate". Cairns Post, 24 September 1890. 
Although Robb agreed to abolish the sick fund if he could also be released from his 
obligation to provide services for the sick and injured. Ibid., 20 September 1890. 
Ibid., 24 September 1890. 
Ibid., 27 September 1890. 
Ibid 
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pressure to bear on the confractor in this dispute"," was followed by a 
resolution that the League was unable to provide financial support to the 
strikers. The strike officially ended on the following Monday, yet atfracted 
little comment, other than the Caims Post noting that "all is now working 
smoothly and well".*'' 
The second section was officially taken over from the confractor on 15 
June 1891.** After the difficulties, deaths and delays that attended the 
constmction of the most expensive and hazardous section of the railway 
from Caims to Herberton, the opening ceremony was a modest occasion. 
The public holiday and reduced excursion fares that locals believed such an 
occasion merited, failed to materialise, and a large number of 
predominantly local residents fravelled by special frain up to Walton's Hotel 
at the end of the section to attend a luncheon offered by Robb. The favour 
was retumed by grateful townspeople at a farewell banquet on 27 July, 
where Robb's perseverance in the face of the obstacles he had encountered 
was acknowledged, along with the fact that: 
[i]t is an open secret that a certain section of the late Ministry were averse 
to the constmction of the line, and by all means in theu- power did their level 
best to strangle the stmggling mfant...and it is safe to assert that it is 
fortunate for the people that his power of resistance was greater than that of 
the pressure brought to bear against hun.*' 
Robb's original tender for constmcting a railway over the coastal range 
had been just under £291,000. When the line was completed he had 
received a total of £589,421, which included additional payments for 
variations to the confract. Yet in June 1892, Robb submitted a Final 
Statement of Claims for a further £263,311/9/8. Having already paid out 
£880,000 for this section, almost exactly twice the sum budgeted for the 
entire line, the govemment referred the claim to arbifration. After protracted 
«* Ibid. 
" Ibid., 1 October 1890. 
*' Queensland Votes and Proceedings, 1891, p.477. 
69 Cairns Post, 28 July 1891. 
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proceedings which included 83 days in court, Robb was awarded 
£20,837/4/5: less tiian 8% of his claim. 
While it is clear that Robb included in his Final Statement some items 
that he did not expect to be accepted, there can be little doubt that he was 
awarded much less than he had an equitable claim to receive. The loose 
wordmg of the confract enabled the govemment to evade many additional 
costs which arose principally from departures by its agents from the 
specifications on which Robb had tendered. 
The original amount voted for a "developmental" line of 47 miles 30 
chains to connect the Herberton field with a coastal port and facilitate the 
occupation and development of the intervening country, was £439,692. The 
£908,837 paid for the 15 miles, 20 chains of line ascending the Barron 
Gorge alone would have a dfrect effect on the timetable for the constmction 
of the third section to Biboohra, and to Herberton, which was not reached 
until October 1910, more than twenty years after the tuming of the first sod. 
The costs associated with the second section of the line from Caims to 
Herberton do not defract from John Robb's achievement in forcing the line 
up the Barron Gorge. One of the most persistent problems Robb had to 
overcome was the fact that he was effectively required to build a different 
railway from one week to the next. Indeed, a significant part of the expense 
associated with the range section resulted, fronically, from the government's 
intention to build a line that was cheap and easy to build and maintain. A 
superficial preliminary survey of the Barron Gorge forced govemment 
engineers to adopt an experimental approach to railway constmction, 
resulting in the confractor bearing a significant part of the resultant costs. 
It was this mtention, and not safety concems, that led to the establishment 
of the Commission into the use of local timbers on the section. 
When John Robb submitted his tender there was no previous experience 
in building a mountain railway under the conditions that he was to 
encounter, in terms of the highly unstable terrain and the fropical intensity 
of rainfall. Building the section in these circumstances, with the additional 
difficulties created by the govemment surveyors and engineers, constitutes 
a remarkable engineering achievement for which Robb merits lasting 
recognition. 
